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Abstract 
Many economists, notably Austrian economists, have argued that the 
market process is essentially an experimental process.  We briefly try to 
clarify this conceptualization, and then argue that we may understand the 
firm in much the same light.   A basic view of the firm as an experimental 
entity is derived, drawing on property rights insights.   
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Introduction1
This paper aims at establishing links between market process economics (Boettke and 
Prychitko 1996) and the theory of economic organization, primarily the theory of the 
firm (Coase 1937; Williamson 1996; Hart 1995; Barzel 1997).  To be sure, these links 
have been explored in previous contributions. For example, earlier work has assessed 
the contribution of Mises’ (1936, 1949) analysis of economic calculation to the 
understanding of the efficient boundaries of the firm (Klein 1996), including issues of 
corporate governance (Klein and Klein 2000); the contribution to the understanding of 
the internal organization of firms provided by Hayek’s (1945) insights in dispersed 
knowledge (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Cowen and Parker 1997; Foss 1999); how 
Austrian economics may inform the study of firm strategy (Jacobson 1992; Lewin and 
Phelan 2000); and how the Austrian view of the market process connects to various 
notions of contracting costs (Vihanto 1992).  However, the perspective in the present 
paper is different from these contributions.  
 Specifically, we begin from the conceptualization of the catallaxy as not only a 
superior method of integrating dispersed knowledge, but also of producing new 
knowledge (Hayek 1968). One of the reasons for this superiority lies in the 
experimental nature of catallactic activity: Experiments in products, processes, 
organization, etc. are continuously being conducted and evaluated. Alienable property 
rights enable decision-makers to carry out such experiments, to a large extent without 
seeking anybody’s approval.   It is a related overall experimental view that we wish to 
transfer to the firm; thus, we consider a experimental activity in the context of firm 
organization.  
 Firms play a central and even dominant role in the process of economic 
experimenting as inventing and innovating teams. They are the basic loci of 
experiments with products, processes and modes of organization, as rich literatures on 
technology, innovation management, and firm strategy suggest (e.g., Rosenberg 1976; 
Sahal 1981; Jacobson 1992; D’Aveni 1994; Miles et al. 1997; Helper, McDuffie and Sabel 
2000).  However, this is hardly reflected in neither Austrian economics, nor in the 
mainstream economics of organization.   While Austrian economists have not been 
particularly interested in the innovative process,2 economists of organization have 
apparently taken Oliver Williamson (1985: 141) observation that “[u]nfortunately, the 
study of innovation is enormously complex” to imply a license to be rather 
complacent about the study of such issues as technical change, learning by doing, and 
changes in the division of labor as these relate to economic organization.  In contrast, 
                                                 
1  The present paper represents an attempt to develop an overall “vision” for a research program 
that we have pursued alone, together, and in the context of the Learning, Incentives and Knowledge 
Program (LINK; http://www.cbs.dk/link) (Foss and Foss 2000a&b, 2001, Kirsten Foss 2001; Nicolai 
Foss 1999, 2000, 2001).  This research program may briefly be described as an attempt to extend the 
reach of the property rights paradigm, particularly in more dynamic directions.  
 
2 Unless, of course, we include Schumpeter in the ranks of the Austrians.   
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the basic point we develop in this paper is that a conceptualization of firms as 
experimenting teams not only furthers our understanding of catallactic activity by 
allowing for a better understanding of the loci of experimental activity; it also allows 
us to develop novel insights into economic organization.   
 Novel products, processes and organizational forms are launched by firms (or 
groups of cooperating firms), and are tested in the experimental procedure of the 
market process.  For example, novelties may become embodied in new products and 
enter into the market process in the form of transactions with consumers or industrial 
users.  However, prior to this injection into the market process, novelties have been 
produced inside the firm, or, perhaps, in cooperative ventures between two or more 
firms.  These processes also involve transactions, that is, the transfer of property rights, 
between various agents. As a huge literature argues, the definition, exchange and 
enforcement of property rights is not costless, the relevant costs being transaction costs 
(Barzel 1997).  Therefore, performing economic experiments is costly, not only in terms 
of direct outlays (R&D expenses, etc.), or in the form of possible parallel 
experimentation, but also in terms of transaction costs.   
 Focusing on these costs and on how they are influenced by, and in turn 
influence, economic experiments allows us to address issues of economic 
organization (see also Foss and Foss 2000a; Kirsten Foss 2001).  In order to focus this 
perspective, we examine the mechanisms inside firms that endogenously produce 
change, such as learning, experimenting, and increasing division of labor, and tie this 
to the issue of coordination in the context of the firm.   We argue that the firm may be 
explained as an institution that emerges in order to coordinate a complex and ongoing 
division of labor, where changes are caused by entrepreneurs experimenting with the 
division of labor so as to be able to reap benefits in terms of increased productivity.  
The property rights structure that characterizes the firm (particularly the authority 
relation) implies that the firm is a low cost institution for experimenting with such 
changes in the division of labor.  
 Our discussion contributes to at least two areas of research.  First, we contribute 
to Austrian economics by arguing that the characteristically Austrian emphasis on 
catallactic activity as to a large extent experimental in nature may be used in such a 
way that it casts new light on firm organization.  Second, we contribute to the 
economics of organization by incorporating issues of learning and experimentation 
into this body of theory.   
Economic Experiments and the Market Process 
A Brief Literature Review 
 Many scholars have, in different ways and from very different positions, 
suggested that the metaphor of experimentation provides an informative 
conceptualization of catallactic activity.3  Thus, Nelson and Winter (1982) base their 
                                                 
3 In spite of the connotations to closed-system conditions in natural science that the word carries 
with it (Bhaskar 1978). 
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evolutionary theory on the notion that “… the market system is (in part) a device 
for conducting and evaluating experiments in economic behavior and 
organization” (Nelson and Winter 1982: 277).  Other scholars in economics who 
have elaborated broadly similar visions of the economic process include 
Schumpeter (1911, 1943),  Mises (1936, 1949), Hayek (1946, 1978), Alchian (1950), 
O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985), Pelikan (1988), Eliasson (1990), Loasby (1991), 
Rosenberg (1992) and Harper  (1996).  
 A number of economic historians (e.g., Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986; North 
1990), often drawing upon the above contributions from economics,  have argued 
that “… the freedom to undertake … experiments has been the essential element 
accounting for the fact that industrialization has been, uniquely, a historical 
product of capitalist societies” (Rosenberg 1992: 181), and have drawn inspiration 
from the above contributions to economics in developing this argument.   
 In a different context, namely that of political philosophy, open’ness to 
experiments in rules, organization, lifestyles, etc. has been one of the traditional 
arguments in favor of the liberal (“great”, “open”) society at least since the writings 
of John Stuart Mill.  This argument can be found, albeit in somewhat different 
versions, in such modern classics of political philosophy as Hayek (1973) and 
Nozick (1974).  On the level of more practical politics, it has been argued the basic 
problem facing public policy is the “…design of institutional arrangements that 
provide incentives to encourage experimentation … without overly insulating these 
experiments from the ultimate test of survival” (Demsetz 1969: 19).   The property 
rights system plays the key role here (North 1990).    
 However, these arguments are somewhat hampered by the fact that it is far from 
entirely clear what is actually meant by the suggestive notion that the market process 
is one of experimental activity. It is certainly tempting to think that the notion of the 
market process as an experimental process is little more than a handy metaphor that 
serves to communicate in a nutshell a deeper and more complicated process view of 
the market.  Moreover, as a general matter, an experiment may be a completely 
unpredictable “voyage of exploration into the unknown” (Hayek 1946: 101) at the one 
extreme.   Or, it may be of the completely controlled kind where the purpose of the 
experiment is merely to reproduce and confirm once more an already well-established 
conjecture  (Bhaskar 1978) at the other extreme.  In fact, Bayesian sampling of 
information may in a generous interpretation be seen as experimenting.4  It is not 
immediately clear which one of these different meanings proponents of the notion that 
the market process is an experimental one have in mind.   
 
Experimental Activity in the Market Process 
 Advance in bringing the experimental conceptualization of the market process 
beyond the metaphor, as well as clarifying the economic counterparts to different 
notions of experimental activities, may well begin from Littlechild’s (1986) discussion 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
4  See Cyert and Kumar (1996) for this interpretation. 
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of “three types of market process”.  Specifically, he (1986: 27) suggests that we 
distinguish between “ideal type” models of the market process based on  
... how the decision makers perceive of the world, how these perceptions 
change over time, how these additional information may be sought, and 
how the decision maker can limit his exposure to uncertainty.   
This epistemic perspective allows Littlechild to identify three ideal typical models of 
the market process, namely what he calls the “neoclassical model” (e.g., Frydman 
1982), the “Austrian model” (e.g., Kirzner 1973, 1992, 1997; High 1986) and the “radical 
subjectivist model” (e.g., Shackle 1972; Lachmann 1986; Loasby 1976, 1991; O’Driscoll 
and Rizzo 1985). All three models in principle make room for experimental activity, 
albeit of different varieties.   
 This may become clearer if we in addition to Littlechild’s epistemically based 
taxonomy also consider Kirzner’s (1997) distinction between two ways of modeling 
ignorance in economic analysis.  First, mainstream models of the asymmetric 
information variety essentially posit that while agents are ignorant about certain 
things, they know precisely the extent of their ignorance.  The standard agency model 
provides an example of this: the principal is ignorant about the exact effort level 
supplied by the agent as well as the exact realization of a stochastic variable that 
influences output, but he is completely informed about the agent’s action set as well as 
the distribution function for the stochastic variable (Holmström 1979). In some models 
agents can take steps through search activities to remedy this ignorance.  For example, 
an agent may conjecture that search for a certain price of a certain good in a certain 
geographical area is warranted in the sense that the expected benefit is larger than the 
expected search costs, and in equilibrium that conjecture will be confirmed by actual 
events.  This activity may arguably be thought of as in a limited sense experimental 
activity.  Similarly, and perhaps stretching the word too far, we might think of risk-
bearing behavior as broadly experimental.5
 Second, there is also the distinct possibility that agents are actually ignorant 
about what they are ignorant about.  In Kirzner’s work, this ignorance is seen as being 
remedied by spontaneous entrepreneurial discovery.  This would seem to leave 
experimental activity out of consideration because setting up and conducting an 
experiment is very much a purposeful testing of a conjecture with an uncertain 
outcome and not a spontaneous discovery.  However, we may think of experimental 
activity as one way in which agents reduce the ignorance that they are initially 
unaware of, for example, through serendipitious discoveries.  Moreover, introducing 
uncertainty into the activities of the Kirznerian entrepreneur remedies the problem: if 
the entrepreneur’s activities may be seen as uncertain conjectures about arbitrage 
                                                 
5  A relevant consideration in this connection is whether information about a risky event is generally 
shared or not. Thus, risk-taking behavior when there is substantial disagreement about the 
probability of the occurrence of a certain event (and it is therefore hard to insure against) is more 
deserving of being called experimental than when there is agreement on the probability (and the 
event is therefore easily insurable).  
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possibilities (Harper 1996), then surely these activities too may be characterized as 
experimental.   
 While Kirzner’s distinction clearly covers what Littlechild (1986) characterizes as 
the neoclassical and the Austrian model, it is less clear how it relates to the radical 
subjectivist model; in fact, it would seem to apply only to some extent:  In the radical 
subjectivist model, agents are exposed to surprises (Shackle 1972), which implies that 
they are ignorant about their own ignorance; otherwise genuine surprises could not 
take place.  On the other hand, the radical subjectivist model stresses imagination, the 
ability to construct the choice set, and the subsequent testing of choices in the market 
process (O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985).  It is a view that is perhaps in greater conformity 
with the conventional understanding of experimentation than the two other views.  
However, all three captures some aspects of experimental activity.    We may sum up 
these insights in the table below.6  
 
                       TABLE 1 
 
                                                                Models of the market process 
 Neoclassical Austrian Radical 
subjectivist 
Characterization 
of the future 
The agent can fully 
characterize the vector 
of variables that is 
relevant for his actions 
and can fully 
characterize the proba-
bility distributions of 
these variables. 
The future “… is a 
vector of which the 
agent knows some 
components but not 
others”. 
The future “… is not so 
much unknown as it is 
non-existent or indeter-
minate at the time of 
decision.  The agent’s 
task is not to estimate 
or discover, but to 
create” 
Agents’ know-
ledge 
Agents know what 
they don’t know.  
Ignorance is reduced 
through search.  
Agents do not know 
what they don’t know. 
Ignorance is reduced 
through spontaneous 
discovery. 
Same as in Austrian 
model. Knowledge is 
inherently conjectural. 
Economic 
experimentation 
Reduction of known 
ignorance; Bayesian 
updating of priors; 
risk-bearing. 
A means to foster 
spontaneous disco-
very.  
A result of imagina-
tion: a test of a bold 
conjecture.  
 
As the table reveals, any sort of forward-looking and risky decision-making (Mises 
1949) may in principle be broadly characterized as experimental.  However, in 
order to focus the discussion, we shall in the following associate experimental 
activity with choice situations characterized by a high degree of imperfection of 
knowledge about the future, and therefore a state of uncertainty that is deeper than 
                                                 
6  The quotations in the table are from Littlechild (1986: 24). 
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what is normally assumed in mainstream economics (i.e., Littlechild’s “neoclassical 
model”).  Thus, the conventional search model does not in this view portray 
experimental behavior.  In our view, agents may still very well hold subjective 
probabilities about the outcomes of events.  However, a key point is that when we 
are talking about experimental activity proper, what is involved are events about 
which disseminated knowledge is not present in the market.   Introducing a new 
product (rather than a product variant), a new process of production, or a new type 
of organization (e.g., Dupont’s introduction of the M-form after First World War, 
Chandler 1962) are instances of commercial experimental activity in the sense we 
have in mind here.   In the following sections we take steps toward integrating this  
view of experimental activity, derived from market process economics, with the 
theory of economic organization. 
Building Blocks for an Experimental View of the Firm 
In this section we develop building blocks an experimental view of the firm and 
provide a sketch of what such a theory may look like.  Our argument is based on a 
combination of insights into the economic implications of property rights and 
Austrian and radical subjectivist insights into imagination and entrepreneurial 
discovery.  On this basis, we shall seek a rationale for firm organization in the 
superior ability to conduct commercial experiments that firms may, under certain 
circumstances, have relative to markets. 
Experimentation and Economic Organization  
 There are some − but not many − hints scattered in the economics of 
organization that experimentation and economic organization are related issues.  
However, the link between the two issues goes back to the founding contributions 
to the theory of economic organization.  Thus, in the view of Frank Knight (1921) 
firm organization, profit, and the entrepreneur are closely related phenomena.  In his 
view, these arise as, respectively, an embodiment, a result and a cause of commercial 
experimentation (Demsetz 1988).  In Knight’s view, the entrepreneur’s conjectures 
are so much clouded by uncertainty and so much inside the his head that they 
cannot be communicated to other agents or insured.  In order to capture profit from 
his commercial conjecture, the entrepreneur has to set up a firm with himself in the 
position of residual claimant.  Thus, a combination of communication costs (Foss 
1993) and moral hazard (Barzel 1987) explains both the firm and profit as a residual 
income category in Knight’s view.  This is one way of linking economic 
organization and commercial experimentation in the marketplace.  
 In his discussion of the “Nature of the Firm”, Coase (1937) implicitly 
establishes a second link. As Coase (1937) observes, it is “... improbable that a firm 
would emerge without the existence of uncertainty”, and it is clear from the context 
that he has Knightian uncertainty in mind.  In an often quoted passage, Coase (1937: 
21) notes that  
 6
It may be desired to make a long-term contract for the supply of some 
article or service ... Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer 
the period of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the 
less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing 
to specify what the other contracting party is expected to do ... Therefore, 
the service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact 
details being left until a later date ... When the direction of resources ... 
becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term 
a “firm” may be obtained. 
While there is nothing directly in Coase’s paper to suggest that he had 
experimentation in mind, we shall develop what we see as a natural implication of his 
argument, namely that an important benefit of the combination of hierarchical 
direction with the incomplete employment contract is that this eases the conducting of 
experiments inside the firm.  This is because the need for, and outcomes of, 
experiments are largely unpredictable, and, hence, cannot be contracted over on an ex 
ante basis (Foss and Foss 2000a).  Given this, hierarchical direction will often be more   
efficient than relational contracting (Demsetz 1991; Williamson 1996; Casson 1997; 
Foss and Foss 2000a).  “Experiments” should be understood in a wide sense, ranging 
all the way from fine-tuning an assembly line over changing various aspects of 
organizational structure to the invention and commercialization of a completely new 
product.   In other words, experimental activity in this sense covers much of “… the 
main activity of a firm, running a business” (Coase 1991: 65). 
 In order to develop the argument that experiments are often most efficiently 
organized by firms, we rely on a branch of economics that also has a strong Coasian 
pedigree (cf. Coase 1960), namely property rights economics (e.g., Barzel 1997).   
Property rights have already been integrated with the theory of economic 
organization beginning with Alchian and Demsetz (1972).  In fact, a modern branch 
of organizational economics is sometimes referred as the “property rights 
approach” (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995).7   In this 
view, property rights are allocated inside firms so as to maximize the bargaining 
power of the agent whose actions matter the most for joint surplus.   Being the 
owner of the firm’s alienable assets, this agent thus avoids being held up by other 
contractual parties in the face of unforeseen contingencies. Joint surplus is 
maximized in this manner. A completely different approach to linking property 
rights and economic organization was introduced by Littlechild (1986: 35) 
suggestion that “... ownership of a resource reduces exposure to unexpected events.  
Property rights are a means of reducing uncertainty without needing to know 
precisely what the source or nature of the future concern will be.” Brian Loasby 
(1991) has tied this view to the capabilities theory of the firm.   Our view is more 
related to the latter view of property rights than to the view of Hart and his 
                                                 
7  This approach is different from the approach of Coase, Alchian, Demsetz and Barzel, and should 
not be confused with it.  See Foss and Foss (2001) for a critical comparison of the two approaches. 
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colleagues and students, since we place more of an emphasis on the flexibility 
provided by ownership than on the bargaining power that it may confer.8  
Property Rights 
 At first glance, the property rights approach (Alchian, 1965; Barzel, 1997; 
Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1964, 1969; Eggertson, 1990; Libecap, 1989; North, 1990) 
seems at variance with Austrian economics. In fact, some vital parts of the 
approach, such as (certain interpretations of) the Coase theorem, have been 
criticized by Austrian economists (e.g., Kirzner 1973: 226-7; and the recent exchange 
between Gunning 2000 and Cordato 2000).  However, what may be objectionable in 
the property rights approach from an Austrian point of view are not the specific 
analytical categories developed within this approach per se. 9   In fact, Austrians have 
for a long time devoted interest to the category of property and its economic 
implications.  This is not the place to engage in a detailed historical exegesis, but it is 
worth noting that the Austrians held interesting views of property rights and 
ownership, views that in various ways dovetail with the Austrian process 
perspective.   
 Thus, Menger (1871) begins (conventionally) by defining property rights as 
economic categories, arising out of scarcity, and then moves on (unconventionally) 
to noting that ownership affords flexibility in the face of uncertainty. For example, 
he observes that fire extinguishers and medicine chests are owned precisely 
because of the unpredictability of the relevant states of nature (Loasby 1999).  
Böhm-Bawerk (1883) provides a lengthy and sophisticated discussion of the 
relation between the law, ownership and property rights.  Mises (1936: 27) points 
out that ownership refers to “the power to use economic goods,” and he 
emphatically stresses that “… the economic significance of the legal should have lies 
only in the support it lends to the acquisition, the maintenance and the regaining of 
the natural having” (emphasis in original).10  In a later work, he noted the 
connection between property rights and externalities (Mises 1949: 654-655), and 
rationalized the emergence of various institutions of property in terms of 
considerations of changing scarcities (1949: 650, 678, 679).  
                                                 
8  This is not to say that the two aspects are unrelated.  For example, the flexibility conferred by an 
authority relation in the context of an employment contract may depend on the boss having 
sufficient bargaining power provided by his ownership of some crucial assets (Foss 2001).  
 
9 The aspects that an Austrian may object to are rather the assumptions in the approach that agents 
always seek to maximize the value of the rights they control and that the process of exchanging rights 
can be represented in terms of equilibrium. Indeed, at least one writer (Eggertson 1990) characterizes 
the approach as “generalized neoclassical economics”.  But Austrians should not have problems with 
the basic notion that property rights are the rights people hold over assets. 
 
10 This is remarkably in line with Barzel’s (1994: 394) definition of a property right “... as an 
individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of the 
asset, or to consume it indirectly through exchange. A key word is ability: The definition is 
concerned not with what people are legally entitled to do but with what they believe they can do”. 
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 After a long neglect, the economic analysis of property rights was given a new 
lease on life in the nineteen-sixties.  Much energy was expended on developing 
fine-grained distinction between various kinds of property rights and on exploring 
the relations between economic and legal definitions of rights.  For example, 
theorists introduced between use rights that define the potential uses of an asset; 
income rights, or the right to consume an asset; rights to exclude non-owners from 
access to assets; and rights to transfer permanently to another party all the above 
mentioned rights over an asset − that is to alienate or sell an assets (Alchian 1965).  
 The property rights approach in its modern version emerged from the insight 
that what is exchanged are not assets per se, but rather the rights to those assets 
(Coase 1960; Alchian 1965).  A further crucial insight was that the exchange of 
rights is not costless.  For example, often physical and human assets have different 
properties and may sometimes yield a number of different services depending on 
how the assets are used.  In principle, each one of the properties and different uses 
of assets can be specified and be subject to negotiations between parties to a 
transaction.  Moreover, use rights over different properties or uses of assets may be 
shared between individuals (Barzel 1997).  To specify and to contract over the 
different possible uses of assets are clearly costly actions − more precisely, they 
involve transaction costs.  In the property rights framework, transaction costs are 
conceptualized as the costs due to the transfer, capture and protection of rights 
(Barzel 1997: 2).  When such costs exist, not everything will be specified in contract; 
they will be left incomplete (Williamson 1985, 1996; Hart 1996; Barzel 1997).  
Changing Property Rights 
 While property rights theorists have done much to clarify the meanings and 
ramifications of property they have done comparatively little to clarify why  
property rights change over time, although some historical evidence has been 
brought to bear on this issue (Demsetz 1967; North 1990).  How property rights 
change have also been a neglected issue, arguably because of the underlying 
comparative-static method in the property rights approach.11   These two issues are, 
however, crucial to our story about firm organization and we need to deal with 
them.  
 Our response to these difficulties begins from the observation that the two 
issues of why and how property rights change are twin issues.  Thus, from an 
Austrian perspective property rights change because of entrepreneurial alertness12; 
alert entrepreneurs may discover that some rearrangement of existing property 
                                                 
11 In Demsetz’ (1967) famous example of how property rights changed among Canadian tribes of 
indians,  the process of change itself is thus a black box. 
 
12 In political economy, this process of entrepreneurs influencing the definition of property rights is 
of course known as “rent-seeking”.  The concept has also been applied to firms’ internal 
organization (Milgrom 1988).  But entrepreneurs grasping rights is a much wider concept than the 
concept of rent-seeking.  Any attempts to capture rights that are in the public domain (Barzel 1997) 
may thus be seen as manifestations of entrepreneurial alertness (Foss and Foss 2000b). 
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rights or some capture of rights that are in the public domain increase their own 
utility.  Clearly, this is an extension of the Kirznerian view of the entrepreneur 
(Kirzner 1973, 1992, 1997).  Arguably, Kirzner tends to take the property rights 
structure as given, and inquire into the arbitrage activities that alert entrepreneurs 
pursue inside this structure.  However, in our view the concept of entrepreneurial 
discovery may be broadened to also encompass discoveries related to re-definitions 
and capture of property rights, and not just to the exchange of these.  It is this 
augmented entrepreneurial perspective that we apply to firms.   
Firms and Changing Property Rights 
 In the view developed here, firms are important vehicles for entrepreneurial 
experimentation with products and processes because the property rights systems 
that characterize firms ⎯ particularly the relative concentration of decision rights in 
the hands of the entrepreneur implied by the authority relation ⎯ often allows this 
experimentation to be carried out at lower costs in firms than in markets.  In 
particular, if the entrepreneur controls knowledge that is costly to communicate to 
other agents, for example, because it has strong tacit components (Hayek 1945), it 
may be efficient to concentrate decision rights in the hands of the entrepreneur and 
rely on direction rather than on consultation and bargaining between independent 
parties (Demsetz 1991; Foss 1993; Casson 1994).   
 Moreover, the property rights structures of firms also imply that they may be 
superior vehicles for experimentation with property rights structures themselves. 
Organizational changes ⎯ such as outsourcing, changes in organizational structure, 
team-based management, etc. (Cowen and Parker 1997; Miles et al. 1997; Zenger 
and Hesterly 1997) ⎯ are thus examples of experiments with the property rights 
structures of firms, since such changes may imply changes in task definitions 
(involving changes in use rights), payment and reward schemes (involving changes 
in income rights), employee ownership of the firm’s stock (rights to alienate assets), 
etc.  But so are the more mundane trials and errors involved in setting up a 
smoothly running production system consisting of many interdependent 
specialized tasks, possibly spanning several stages of production.  In fact, to focus 
our discussion, we shall focus on exactly this kind of experimentation (see also 
Kirsten Foss 2001).  
Complex Production Systems and Experimental Activity 
 Experimenting with running a production system, that is, a system of 
interdependent production activities (tasks), is only needed if there is uncertainty 
with respect to the best way of setting up and running the production systems, 
including how to source, organize, sequence, monitor, etc. inputs, define and 
sequence tasks, etc.  In the world portrayed by the neoclassical theory of 
production, all this is fundamentally not a problem: Everything is laid out in the 
book of blueprints; thus, experimentation is not necessary (Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Langlois and Foss 1999). However, as the Austrians emphasize, production 
technologies are not just given: They have to be discovered, and often discovered 
anew, for example, when unanticipated changes in preferences, technology and 
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regulation make a change of the firm’s capital structure necessary (Hayek 1941; 
Lachmann 1956).  In this sort of experimenting with heterogeneous production 
technologies, we find a key function of the entrepreneur.  As Lachmann (1956: 13, 
16) stressed,  
… We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital 
combinations … will be ever changing, will be dis-solved and re-formed.  
In this activity, we find the real function of the entrepreneur. 
 [T]he entrepreneur’s function … is to specify and make decisions 
on the concrete form the capital resources shall have.  He specifies and 
modifies the layout of his plant ... As long as we disregard the 
heterogeneity of capital, the true function of the entrepreneur must also 
remain hidden.  In a homogenous world there is no scope for the activity 
of specifying. 
We agree with Lachmann’s points that interdependencies between assets are 
important for understanding the problem of organization, that unexpected 
contingencies upset existing combinations, that the entrepreneur task is to 
coordinate the uses of assets, and that most of the attendant problems would be 
trivialized in a homogeneous world.   By a “homogenous world”, Lachmann has in 
mind a setting where capital goods/assets are only substitutes, and not 
complements, and, furthermore, where all capital goods/assets (save perhaps for 
human capital) are perfect substitutes. In the terminology used here, a 
homogeneous world would be one in which the assignment of use rights to assets 
would be trivialized, since one asset would serve as well in production as another 
asset.  There would be no real problems of managed coordination, although there 
might be problems of moral hazard related to the use of assets, possibly requiring 
some monitoring.  In this world, it would be hard to discriminate between firms 
and markets, primarily because managed coordination would cease to exist.  Thus, 
a first conclusion appears to be that the Austrian emphasis on heterogeneous 
capital appears to be necessary for the theory of economic organization.  Moreover, 
the Austrian emphasis on ongoing experimentation undertaken by profit-motivated 
entrepreneurs (Mises 1949; Lachmann 1986; Klein and Klein 2000), which explains 
why heterogeneity persists (Jacobson 1992), yields further insights into economic 
organization.   One mechanism that helps to understand ongoing, endogenous 
change, brought about by entrepreneurial, lies in the age-old theme of the division 
of labor.  
Specialization and Property Rights 
 Virtually all contributors to the theory of economic organization (Langlois 
1992 being one exception) take the costs of coordinating various tasks, as well as the 
extent of specialization in the economy, as given.  To be sure, the costs of 
coordination crucially depend on the degree of specialization. However, the degree 
of specialization also depends on the costs of coordinating increasingly specialized 
tasks balanced against the (imagined) benefits (i.e., productivity increases) from 
specialization (Loasby 1995).  This has profound implications for the theory of the 
firm.   To see this, we need to go back to Adam Smith. 
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 As Smith pointed out in The Wealth of Nations, specialization in production is a 
source of productivity improvements.  Specifically, he ascribes productivity gains 
to improvements in a worker’s ability to perform a task as it is repeated more often, 
the time that is saved from avoiding having to switch from one task to another, and 
an improved ability of workers to identity labor saving innovations.  At least the 
first and third advantages of the division of labour are related to improvements in 
knowledge.  Thus, the discovery of new knowledge is aided by the division of labor 
(Richardson 1975).  In fact, as Loasby (1995: 302) argues:  
…the division of labour is to be thought of, not as a model of the efficient 
allocation of a given array of skills, but as a method of fostering the 
development of skills, and indeed generating other kinds of knowledge.  
It is a discovery process”.  
 Many of the labor saving innovations envisaged by Adam Smith are results of 
workers’ experiments with their own tasks in their own “circumstances of time and 
place” (Hayek 1945). In our perspective, the extent and character of such 
experimentation depends on the allocation of property rights ⎯ notably use rights 
but also income rights (Zenger and Hesterly 1997) ⎯ inside the firm (Kirsten Foss 
2001).  Thus, there is a connection between discovery and learning on the one hand 
and the allocation of use rights on the other hand.  This connection is a consequence 
of the fact that learning and discovery will often require the exercise of use rights 
over assets.  Patterns of learning depend on the allocation of use rights between 
different individuals over time and specialization in production may be one reason 
for reallocation of use rights.  Thus, specialization in production can be tied to the 
possession of use rights to the extent that we interpret specialization as reflecting a 
subdivision of use rights over assets.13  
 This implies that the extent of experimentation depends on how well-specified 
and easily monitored use rights are, since the more well specified they are, the less 
able are those who use assets to experiment and the more constrained will their 
experimentation and discovery be.14  Discretion may thus enable individuals to 
learn a broader set of skills and to conduct experiments which may result in 
innovations.  In this sense, there is a direct link between property rights and 
possibilities of discovery.15  
                                                 
13 So that each individual holds rights over a more narrow set of assets or holds a more narrow set 
of rights over the same assets. 
 
14 If, for example, the manner in which a computer operator runs a program is pre-specified in a 
contract and easily monitored, his learning by doing may be limited to improving the speed with 
which he activates the keyboard.  If he has greater discretion in deciding how to operate the 
program, he might have a greater opportunity for learning by experimenting. 
 
15 This is a possible economic interpretation of the much hyped talk about “empowerment” in the 
workplace. 
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Coordination and Property Rights 
 So far we have told a story inspired by both Smith and Hayek in which the 
discretionary behavior of agents result in productivity gains.  However, 
discretionary behavior may not always result in such gains.  First, if the 
discretionary behavior takes place inside a firm, shirking or other ways of 
appropriating a greater part of the value from the use of an asset are possible 
instances of discretionary behavior.16  Thus, there is a trade-off here between local 
innovativeness and the possibility of morally hazardous behavior (Jensen and 
Meckling 1992; Nicolai Foss 2001). To some extent, these problems may be 
mitigated by giving agents a share of output (e.g., Minkler 1993).  Second, 
discretionary behavior may cause problems when various kinds of 
interdependencies are present (Rosenberg 1976; Sahal 1981; Langlois 1992; Milgrom 
and Roberts 1992; Nicolai Foss 2000a).17  For example, in production systems that 
are characterized by strong interdependencies between tasks, discretionary 
behavior may result in bottlenecks or in uneven development of components.  
 From a property rights perspective, such seemingly technological problems 
may be ascribed to imperfectly specified rights over assets.  If rights had been 
perfectly specified, which they would have been had knowledge been perfect 
(Barzel 1994), the coordination problems caused by bottlenecks, etc. would have 
been eliminated. Essentially, these technological problems are externalities.  
Ongoing changes of the division of labor, as entrepreneurs experiment with 
dividing production tasks, introduce more complexity as more interdependencies 
are introduced, which in turn introduce more uncertainty.  Thus, it may be difficult 
for the entrepreneur to specify all valued dimensions of assets prior to 
specialization, since many of the valued dimensions of assets only become apparent 
from experimenting with the uses of assets and discovering the best uses of those 
assets.18  Given the great deal of interdependence that may exist in a complex 
production system which may span several stages of production and involve 
myriads of inputs and numerous tasks, the best time and place to use an asset 
depend on the specification of the uses of all other assets that are needed in 
production (Hayek 1941). 
                                                 
16  In Leijonhufvud’s (1986) story, the interdependencies that characterize the division of labour also 
introduce the possibility of hold-up (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Williamson 1985, 1996).  
We neglect this possibility here. 
 
17 The concept of “complementarities” in the modern economics of organization (idem.; Hart 1995) 
covers much of what we mean by interdependencies.  (Complementarities/interdependencies were 
also much emphasized in Austrian capital theory, e.g., Lachmann 1956).  However, in contrast to the 
modern economics of organization, we emphasize coordination rather than hold-up problems and 
the like.  
 
18 Even if important dimensions can in fact be specified, it may be difficult to allocate these rights in 
ways that ensure the best use of assets.  This may, for example, be the case with the time and place 
dimension of assets where non-optimal allocations result in excess stocks of intermediate products 
or in idle assets. 
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 This creates costs of specialization due to unsolved coordination problems, 
that is, problems of making agents’ plans mesh (Hayek 1937, 1941; Lachmann 1956; 
Malmgren 1961; Richardson 1975).  In firms, such coordination problems emerge as, 
for example, problems of bottlenecks.  These are problems where complexity and 
interdependent activities make it difficult to specify how best to sequence various 
activities, or where the introduction of more specialized tools and equipment 
creates capacity utilization problems due to technical indivisibilities, or where 
innovations in individual activities result in an uneven development of tools, 
equipment and components.  Basically these problems arise when those who 
deliver parts or carry out activities are not aware of the need for mutual 
adjustment, or do not have the incentive to make their activities mesh with those of 
others.   
 Solving problems that arise from technological interdependencies is an 
important souse of innovative improvements (Rosenberg 1976; Sahal 1981).  
However, such innovations do not emerge because of increased specialization, but 
because of learning in coordination.  The question then arises: What governance 
structure best provides for experimentation and accumulation of experience in 
coordination?  We shall follow basic Coasian arguments (Coase 1937, 1991), and 
stress that one of the reasons why managed coordination through the use of the 
authority relation may be advantageous relative to price coordination is because the 
former reduces costs of learning about the coordination of technologically 
interdependent tasks.    
Experimenting and Learning: Firms as Low Cost Experimenters 
 It is in the handling of the coordination problems associated with  
interdependencies between tasks that we may find a rationale for the firm.  
Specifically, firms can be viewed as solutions to problems of coordination in situations 
where use rights over assets cannot be perfectly specified and allocated in manners 
which ensures the functionality of complex technologies. Such situations may occur 
because agents have only limited computational capacity (Williamson 1985, 1996), 
making it to difficult for them to specify use rights in ways that solve problems of 
interdependencies.  Or they may occur because agents face uncertainty in the sense 
that they lack the ability to imagine “... the alternatives between which decisions are 
made” (Littlechild 1986: 29). This kind of uncertainty (which characterizes the radical 
subjectivist model) has typically been attributed to the possibility of inventions that 
change the set of alternatives between which economic agent can choose and thus also 
the structure of (shadow) prices.  However, such uncertainty is also associated with 
much experimental activity.  In the context of “running a business” (Coase 1991), a 
large part of experimental activity lies in the many trials and errors involved with 
setting up and maintaining a smoothly running production system, consisting of 
many interdependent specialized tasks and assets.  Of course, such experimentation is 
only needed if there is uncertainty with respect to the best way of operating 
technically interdependent production systems.  Because of such technological 
uncertainty, firms may start different kinds of experiments and follow different paths 
of learning. 
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 The firm provides a low cost way of discovering solutions to coordination 
problems related to bottlenecks and uneven development of components.  For 
managed direction of resources to be efficient, it is required that entrepreneurs are 
at least as qualified in discovering the relevant prices (that is, finding the highest 
valued uses of assets) as independent contractors would be.19 Otherwise, costs of 
transacting may be saved at the expense of efficiency in the use of resources.  If 
entrepreneurs are better able to determine the valuable uses of resources compared 
to other agents, entrepreneurs have a ownership advantage over resources.   Such 
an advantage explains the single person firm, but not necessarily why 
entrepreneurs hire employees who are prepared to take orders within certain limits 
in order to take advantage of this knowledge.  Entrepreneurs could as well rent the 
labor time of an agent in return for the exercise of a certain well specified task. 
 However, in actuality, entrepreneurs stand a good chance of acquiring 
superior knowledge about the best uses of the assets that make up a complex 
technology (Demsetz 1991; Casson 1994).  From the innovation literature, it is 
apparent that the solution to problems of bottlenecks and uneven development in 
components are based on learning by doing in production and development 
(Rosenberg 1976; Sahal 1981).   The argument here is that this experience from 
learning by doing is probably more easily accumulated within the boundaries of 
firms.   One of the reasons why one might expect this learning to be less costly 
within the boundaries of firms may be that entrepreneurs who hold residual rights 
over assets -- including rights to re-define and reallocate specific rights -- are able to 
conduct experiments. They can do this without continuously having to re-negotiate 
contracts (which will have more or less unforeseen outcomes because of the 
uncertain nature of the experimental process).  This saves all sorts of (transaction) 
costs related to time, bargaining and contract drafting (Foss and Foss 2000a).20   
 Entrepreneurs are then able to create “controlled” experiments in which they 
only change some aspects of the tasks in order to trace the effects of some specific 
re-arrangements of rights.  Setting up a controlled experiment may be more 
difficult across the boundaries of firms, particularly when interdependencies exists 
between firms and if it is difficult to specify all the tasks which must and must not 
be changed.  Coordinating interdependent tasks within the boundaries of a firm 
may provide entrepreneurs with a more complete picture of the nature of 
interdependencies. Such information is not only important in relation to 
                                                 
19 Coase (1937) mentions “... increasing opportunity costs due to the failure of entrepreneurs to 
make the best use of the factor of production” (p.23) as one of the factors which set a limit to the 
efficient size of a firm. He also assumes that “… the costs of losses through mistakes will increase 
with an increase in the spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the 
transactions, and in the probability of changes in the relevant prices. As more transactions are 
organized by an entrepreneur, it would appear that the transactions would tend to be either 
different in kind or in different places” (p.25). Managers, in other words, have limited capacity to 
“discover the relevant prices” and this increases the occurrence of mistakes as more and more 
dissimilar transactions are organized in a firm.   
 
20 In this connection wage contracts may be an efficient way of sharing risks from experimenting. 
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eliminating bottlenecks, but also in relation to avoiding problems of uneven 
development of components by setting up interface standards and other more 
permanent solutions.   It may also be important in connection with establishing 
organizational structure inside a firm, since this structure at least partly reflects the 
nature and sequence of productive tasks.21  
Specialization and the Boundaries of Firms 
 So far, the argument has been that relative to markets, firms may economize 
on the transaction costs of learning the best way of coordinating technological 
interdependent systems.  Now, once a firm has discovered how to coordinate some 
specialized tasks, there would be little advantage from managed direction relative 
to market transacting, and coordination by order contracts may substitute for 
coordination by management.22 The task will be spun-off. However, such 
specialization between firms gives way to economic gains from further 
specialization in tasks, and this in turn creates new uncertainty and new 
opportunities for reducing coordination costs by means of experimental activity. In 
other words, there will be an ongoing process of specialization in tasks, learning in 
coordination and specialization between firms and new ways of coordination will 
continuously be imagined by entrepreneurs, much like the process of cumulative 
causation envisaged by Allyn Young (1928).  Thus, firms contain many mechanisms 
that endogenously produce change, such as the (related) mechanisms of ongoing 
learning, experimenting, and changes in the division of labor, and these have 
profound consequences for the process aspects of economic organization.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have brought market process ideas to bear on the theory of the firm.  
In particular, we have argued that it is possible to arrive at an experimental view of the 
firm from broadly Austrian principles.  Thus, the experimental view of the firm 
developed here stresses the role of the firm as a repository for a broad range of 
experiments, mostly with production technology.   It is a view that stresses the role of 
discovery and learning.  However, experimental activities are in general costly, and 
are particularly to be so when experimentation with strongly interdependent 
technologies is involved. The costs of coordinating such technologies may be reduced 
by bringing them in-house. This explains the existence of the firm from an 
experimental point of view.     
                                                 
21  Thus, although we have stressed experimentation in connection with complex production 
systems that may span several stages of production, our view is not inconsistent with the 
contemporary emphasis on more or less autonomous teams that experiment with local, well-defined 
products and activities (Cowen and Parker1997; Miles at al. 1997).  Even in firms that are based on 
project teams, there are multiple complementarities between activities and therefore often a need for 
hierarchical direction (Foss 2000a&b). 
 
22 Managed direction could still be advantageous in cases where adaptation of interdependent 
production systems to unforseen contingences were called for. 
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 The story we have tried to tell in this paper is broadly consistent with much of 
the modern economics of organization.  Thus, we have borrowed ideas from the 
property rights literature (e.g., Barzel 1997), and have applied these ideas to settings 
involving complementarities between assets and activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; 
Hart 1995).  Like Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985, 1996) we have stressed the 
superior flexibility conferred by incomplete contracts in the context of an authority 
relation.  However, we have invested these ideas with distinctively market process 
interpretations, first, by stressing the experimental nature of economic activity, second, 
by arguing that a primary task of the entrepreneur/manager is to conduct controlled 
experiments with interdependent production technologies, and, third, by assuming 
that the goal of these experiments is to achieve internal plan consistency (i.e., make the 
production process run smoothly).  Clearly, all of this can be taken further; our main 
aim has been to provide building blocks and suggest that a distinct view of economic 
organization is possible, based on market process fundamentals.  
 17
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